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Abstract
The prominent but unproven intuition that preference heterogeneity reduces redistribution
in a standard optimal tax model is shown to hold under the plausible condition that the distri-
bution of preferences for consumption relative to leisure rises, in terms of rst-order stochastic
dominance, with income. Given familiar functional form assumptions on utility and the distri-
butions of ability and preferences, a simple statistic for the e¤ect of preference heterogeneity on
marginal tax rates is derived. Numerical simulations and suggestive empirical evidence demon-
strate the link between this potentially measurable statistic and the quantitative implications
of preference heterogeneity for policy.
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Introduction
In the early years of modern optimal tax research, theorists assumed all individuals have the same
preferences over consumption and leisure. James A. Mirrleess (1971) second simplifying assumption
was that "Di¤erences in tastes...are ignored. These raise rather di¤erent kinds of problems, and it
is natural to assume them away." This simplication freed Mirrlees to assume that the only way
in which people di¤er is in their ability to earn income.1 His powerful approachalong with his
assumption of preference homogeneitynow dominates theoretical work on tax design.
Preference heterogeneity of this form, however, appears to be an evident feature of reality.
Kahneman (2011) reports that such preference di¤erences are widespread among young adults and
correlate with outcomes later in life. Data shown in this paper from the World Values Survey
reveal that respondents report a wide range of views toward the value of material possessions.
More anecdotally, people choose a wide range of consumption-leisure bundles, even conditional on
apparent budget constraints.
Heterogeneous preferences for consumption relative to leisure can be included in a standard
Mirrleesian model without any impact on the results if societys normative attitude toward those
preferences is the same as that toward income-earning abilities. In fact, in that case the distinction
between preferences and ability is merely semantic, as they are also observationally equivalent. That
is, an individual may earn a low income, and respond to taxes the way he does, either because he
has low ability or because he has a weak relative preference for consumption.
In contrast, if society does not view these preferences as normatively equivalent to abilities,
preference heterogeneity has implications for optimal taxation, and these implications are the focus
of our paper. We analyze the impact of society adopting the normative view that individuals are to
be, in the inuential terminology of Marc Fleurbaey and François Maniquet (2004), compensated
for having low abilities but held responsible for their preferences.2 In that case, societys preferred
unconstrained policy could range from, for example, full equalization of outcomes (if income dif-
ferences are entirely due to ability) to no redistribution (if income di¤erences are entirely due to
preferences).
1Mirrlees was not the rst to adopt this simplication. Arthur Pigou (1928) wrote, in a classic text: "Of
course, in so far as tastes and temperaments di¤er, allowance ought, in strictness, to be made for this fact...But,
since it is impossible in practice to take account of variations between di¤erent peoples capacity for enjoyment, this
consideration must be ignored, and the assumption made, for want of a better, that temperamentally all taxpayers
are alike."
2Other ways in which individuals vary may merit partial compensation. We limit our focus to the form of preference
heterogeneity most clearly distinct from income-earning ability. See Kaplow (2008) for a discussion of other specic
cases.
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Results characterizing the e¤ects of this form of preference heterogeneity on optimal tax policy
in a general setting have proven elusive, despite an early demonstration of its potential importance
by Agnar Sandmo (1993).3 This lack of results has left us without a clear understanding of the
conditions under which the prominent but unproven intuition that heterogeneity in preferences
lowers optimal redistribution holds and, when it does hold, how large the e¤ects are. For example,
despite the arguments made by prominent critics of redistribution,4 in principle adding preference
heterogeneity to the model may increase optimal redistribution. Intuitively, if preferences for con-
sumption relative to leisure are lower among those with high incomes, attributing income variation
to ability alone will understate the income-earning abilities of high earners and imply an optimal
extent of redistribution that is too small.
In this paper, we derive two novel results that clarify how the presence of preference hetero-
geneity a¤ects the optimal extent of income redistribution. In both cases, we show that there is a
transparent formal mechanism through which we can model the e¤ects of preference heterogeneity:
namely that it changes the pattern of welfare weights the social planner assigns along the income
distribution. One interpretation of our results, therefore, is that they make explicit the way in which
preference heterogeneity has often implicitly entered debates over optimal redistribution. Through-
out, we refer to the conventional case in which all income heterogeneity is treated as due to ability
di¤erences or, equivalently, to di¤erences in characteristics with the same normative implications
as ability, as the "homogeneous preferences" case.
Our rst contribution is to derive a straightforward condition under which heterogeneity in pref-
erences lowers optimal redistribution: if the distribution of the relative preference for consumption
3Mirrlees (1976, 1986) addressed the general case but obtained inconclusive results. Some prior work adopts
specialized settings, such as Sandmos (1993) insightful analysis with only preference (not ability) heterogeneity;
Robin Boadway, Maurice Marchand, Pierre Pestieau, and Maria del Mar Racioneros (2002) results with two preference
types, two ability levels, and quasilinear utility; Sören Blomquist and Vidar Christiansens (2008) ndings when high-
skill individuals vary in tastes for leisure; and Fleurbaey and Maniquets (2006) analysis with a specic normative
approach. Other work has focused on numerical simulations, such as Ritva Tarkiainen and Matti Tuomala (2007)
or Kenneth L. Judd and Che-Lin Su (2006), who explain the computational complexities associated with multiple
dimensions of heterogeneity. Two other recent papers focus on related but somewhat di¤erent questions. Narayana
Kocherlakota and Christopher Phelan (2009) focus on the policy implications of uncertainty over the relationship
between individuals preferences and another, welfare-relevant, dimension of heterogeneity such as wealth. They
argue that such uncertainty causes a planner using a maximin objective to avoid redistributive policy that is optimal
when no such uncertainty is present. Paul Beaudry, Charles Blackorby, and Dezso Szalay (2009) indirectly address
preference di¤erences by including in their optimal tax analysis di¤erences in productivity of market and non-market
labor e¤ort. They show that the optimal redistributive policy makes transfers to the poor conditional on work.
4See Robert Nozick (1974), "Why should we treat the man whose happiness requires certain material goods or
services di¤erently from the man whose preferences and desires make such goods unnecessary for his happiness?" Or,
Milton Friedman (1962), "Given individuals whom we are prepared to regard as alike in ability and initial resources,
if some have a greater taste for leisure and others for marketable goods, inequality of return through the market is
necessary to achieve equality of total return or equality of treatment."
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over leisure rises with income (in terms of rst-order stochastic dominance), then optimal marginal
tax rates are lower at all incomes and the net transfer to the lowest earner is smaller than in the
homogeneous preferences case. Using the standard optimal tax model, we show this result analyt-
ically for the case of quasilinear utility studied in Diamond (1998) and isoelastic welfare weights
that decrease with ability. We also show, through numerical simulations, that the result holds for
more general functional forms of utility and social welfare. In other words, we describe a formal
mechanism through which preference heterogeneity may reduce the optimal extent of redistribution
in a standard optimal tax framework.
Second, we derive a simple statistic for quantifying the e¤ect of heterogeneity in preferences on
optimal marginal tax rates and redistribution. In rough terms, that statistic corresponds to the
share of income variation that is due to di¤erences in preferences. If we assume certain familiar
functional forms for the distributions of ability and preferences, that statistic summarizes the
implications of preference heterogeneity for marginal tax rates, but it also can be used more broadly
as an intuitive guide to the role of preferences. We demonstrate the link between this statistic
and the quantitative implications of preference heterogeneity for optimal policy using numerical
simulations calibrated to the U.S. economy. We also use survey data on self-perceptions related to
these preferences to estimate empirically the variation in this statistic across OECD countries and
show suggestive evidence that existing policy variation appears to be consistent with our theoretical
ndings. Our ndings suggest that this simple statistic may be a fruitful target for future empirical
work.
We obtain our novel analytical results by combining two recent innovations in the literature with
a third innovation of our own. First, in a setting with a continuum of agents and standard utility
functions, Philippe Choné and Guy Laroque (2010) show how heterogeneity in the opportunity cost
of work can justify negative marginal tax rates at low incomes.5 They achieve this important nding
in part by collapsing multiple dimensions of heterogeneity into a single composite characteristic that
determines behavior.6 We focus on a form of preferencesi.e., for consumption relative to leisure
that has the same e¤ects on behavior as ability and therefore allows us, like Choné and Laroque, to
obtain an analytically tractable model in which individuals di¤er in multiple ways.7 Related, our
formal approach has much in common with theirs. Second, we adopt the moral reasoning behind the
5Katherine Cu¤ (2000) is an earlier, related analysis of the case for negative marginal tax rates.
6This technique is similar to that used by Craig Brett and John Weymark (2003). Casey Rothschild and Florian
Scheuer (2013) use a di¤erent method to avoid the technical problems with multi-dimensional income-earning ability.
7This technique cannot help with all dimensions of heterogeneity, such as time discounting as in Mikhail Golosov,
Maxim Troshkin, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Matthew Weinzierl (2013) or Peter Diamond and Johannes Spinnewijn (2011).
4
"second fairness requirement" in the prominent work of Marc Fleurbaey and François Maniquet
(2006), which states that "the laisser-faire (this is, the absence of redistribution) should be the
social optimum in the hypothetical case when all agents have equal earning abilities" even if they
have di¤erent preferences.8 In other words, we adopt the normative perspective that preferences
over consumption and leisure do not justify redistribution by themselves. Though specic, this
interpretation follows if preferences are thought of as tastes as opposed to, for example, needs
(see Kaplow 2008 for a discussion). Third, and crucially, we introduce the technique of studying
how optimal policy changes when a given distribution of income is attributed to more than one
source of heterogeneity, rather than how optimal policy changes when ability is augmented with
additional sources of heterogeneity that change the distribution of income. This shift makes possible
our progress over prior results. It has the additional virtue of formulating the problem in a way
resembling that faced by policymakers, who must decide the appropriate extent of redistribution
in the face of an observable income distribution.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents a standard optimal tax model that explicitly
incorporates preference heterogeneity and derives our result on its implications for redistribution.
Section 2 describes a simple summary statistic for quantifying the e¤ect of preference heterogeneity
on optimal policy and applies it in both calibrated numerical simulations and suggestive empirical
evidence. Secion 3 concludes, while proofs and numerical simulations demonstrating the robustness
of our ndings to the functional forms of utility and social welfare are collected in the online
Appendix.
1 Optimal Income Taxation with Heterogeneous Preferences
Our rst novel analytic result is to derive a condition under which the presence of preference
heterogeneity reduces the optimal extent of redistribution. First we present a simple weighted
utilitarian version of the standard Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal income taxation with gener-
alized type-specic welfare weights,and we demonstrate a relationship between the structure of
those weights and optimal redistribution. We then modify that model to allow heterogeneity in
type to be attributed to observationally equivalent but (possibly) normatively distinct di¤erences
8Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) impose informational constraints on the social planner which rule out conventional
utilitarian social welfare functions and which, in combination with particular fairness requirements on allocations,
imply the use of a maximin social welfare function. They conclude that the optimal income tax should maximize the
subsidies to the working poor: that is, it should be quite redistributive to those with low ability but who exert labor
e¤ort. Our analysis can be seen as a complement to theirs, studying the same type of preference heterogeneity in a
setting closer to the more conventional Mirrleesian approach.
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in income-earning ability and preferences for consumption relative to leisure. We impose a norma-
tive requirementpreference neutralityon the relationship between welfare weights and preferences,
and we show how preference-neutral welfare weights are determined endogenously from the joint
distribution of ability and preferences. Finally, we show the conditions under which the presence
of preference heterogeneity results in less (or more) redistribution at the optimum.
1.1 A standard model with homogeneous preferences
Individuals have utility of consumption c and labor e¤ort ` given by u(c; `) = c   `1+1=" where "
is the constant elasticity of labor supply. As in Mirrlees (1971), they are indexed by unobservable
ability n  0, equal to their (assumed exogenous) marginal product of labor e¤ort, so that gross
income y is equal to n`. Thus we can write utility as a function of consumption, earnings, and
type:
U(c; y; n) = c  (y=n)1+1=": (1)
Ability is distributed according to F (n) with assumed density f(n), and a planner selects the
allocation fc(n); y(n)g to maximize a weighted sum of utilities, solving
max
fc(n);y(n)g
Z 1
0
g(n)U(c(n); y(n); n)f(n) dn; (2)
where g(n) > 0 denotes the welfare weight for type n (sometimes called the Pareto weight) as-
sumed to be continuous and decreasing in n but otherwise left exogenous until the next subsection.9
The maximization in (2) is subject to a resource constraint,
Z 1
0
(y(n)  c(n))f(n) dn  0; (3)
and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints
U(c(n); y(n); n)  U(c(m); y(m); n); 8m;n:
In this setup, an allocation fc(n); y(n)g may be implemented by specifying a corresponding
9This setup is similar to the structure in Diamond (1998), in which the planner maximizesR1
0
	(U(c(n); y(n); n))f(n) dn, for concave 	(), in that any concave 	() can be used to construct type-specic
welfare weights with g(n) = 	0(U(c(n); y(n); n)) at the optimal allocation. These weights will then give rise to
the same second-best optimal allocation as 	() in our setting. See Werning (2007) and Salanié (2011) for related
analyses.
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income tax function T (y) = y   c, in which case the IC constraints can be written as follows:
y(n) = arg max
y
n
y   T (y)  (y=n)1+1="
o
; 8n: (4)
As in Diamond (1998), we represent these IC constraints with the rst-order conditions for each
types choice of y:10
1  T 0(y(n))  (1 + 1=")

y(n)
n1+"
1="
= 0; 8n:
In this case, the optimal tax function is characterized by the following rst-order condition (Dia-
mond, 1998).
T 0(y(n))
1  T 0(y(n)) =
1 + 1="
nf(n)
(G(n)  F (n)); 8n; (5)
where
G(n) =
R n
m=0 g(m)f(m) dmR1
m=0 g(m)f(m) dm
(6)
is the cumulative welfare weightat n, normalized so that G(0) = 0 and limn!1G(n) = 1.
1.2 A relationship between welfare weights and optimal redistribution
We are interested in the relationship between welfare weights and the shape of the optimal tax
function T (y (n)). Here it is useful to establish a partial ranking of tax functions based on their
redistributivity. Loosely, a tax is considered redistributive when it transfers resources from higher
earners, for whom T (y(n)) > 0, to lower earners via a lump sum grant  T (y (0)) > 0. Formally,
we will employ the following denition:
Denition 1 The income tax function T (y (n)) is less redistributive than T^ (y^ (n)) if it imposes
weakly lower marginal income tax rates on all types (i.e., T 0(y(n))  T^ 0(y^(n)) for all n) and provides
a strictly smaller lump sum grant,  T (y (0)) <  T^ (y^ (0)).
It is worth noting that this is a rather demanding denition which leaves many pairs of tax
functions unranked in terms of redistributivity. For example, under this denition a function
T (y (n)) that decreases the lump sum grant and most marginal tax rates but increases a subset of
marginal tax rates relative to T^ (y^ (n)) would not qualify as less redistributive. The strictness of
this denition helps us to avoid ambiguity in our results on the extent of optimal redistribution.
10This assumption is equivalent to assuming that, at the optimum, T (y) is di¤erentiable and y0 (n) > 0, the latter of
which ensures that the individuals choice is globally optimal (note that the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition
is ensured by the functional form of U(c; y; n), see Salanié, 2011). We abstract from the technical complications that
might arise by allowing bunching (i.e., multiple types earning the same income).
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Using this denition, we obtain the following relationship between cumulative welfare weights
and optimal redistribution.
Lemma 1 Consider income tax functions T (y (n)) and T^ (y^ (n)) that solve the planners problem
in (2), (3), and (4) given welfare weights g(n) and g^(n) that are everywhere continuous, positive,
and decreasing in n. If the corresponding cumulative welfare weights G(n) and G^(n) dened in (6)
satisfy G(n) < G^(n) for all n > 0, then T (y (n)) is less redistributive than T^ (y^ (n)).
As this lemma suggests, the shape of the welfare weights g (n) will be key to our results. We
now turn to the characterization of that shape when preferences are heterogeneous.
1.3 Welfare weights in the presence of heterogeneous preferences
We begin by introducing a modication to the model above. Individuals are now characterized by
a two-dimensional type, (w; ), where w  0 is an individuals unobservable ability (their marginal
product of labor e¤ort) so that y = w`, while  > 0 is an unobservable preference parameter scaling
the disutility that an individual experiences from exerting labor e¤ort relative to the utility the
individual experiences from consumption. We assume  is scaled so that the population average of
 is equal to one. Whereas utility of consumption and labor e¤ort, u(c; `), was homogeneous in the
previous section, it now depends on the preference parameter: u(c; `; ) = c   (`=)1+1=". We can
also write individual utility analogously to (1) as follows:
U(c; y; w; ) = c 
 y
w
1+1="
: (7)
The structure of (7) demonstrates that agents with di¤erent pairs of types face the same maximiza-
tion problem. Specically, an individual of type (w0; 0) behaves exactly like another individual of
type (w00; 00) 6= (w0; 0) if w00 = w0000.
The product w is thus su¢ cient to determine individual labor supply behavior we will call this
product the individuals unied type. Because it is impossible to distinguish between individuals
of the same unied type, policy must treat them identically. Thus the planners choice space is the
set of allocations fc(w); y(w)g.
We again assume the planner seeks to maximize a weighted sum of utilities, and we denote the
welfare weights b(w; ) to reect their possible dependence on both ability and preferences. Letting
H(w; ) denote the joint distribution of ability and preferences, with density h(w; ), the planners
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objective in this modied problem is
max
fc(w);y(w)g
Z 1
=0
Z 1
w=0
b(w; )U(c(w); y(w); w; )h(w; ) dw d: (8)
This maximization is subject to the resource constraint
Z 1
=0
Z 1
w=0
(y(w)  c(w))h(w; ) dw d  0; (9)
and IC constraints, written in terms of the tax function T (y(w)) = y(w)  c(w),
y(w) = arg max
y

y   T (y) 
 y
w
1+1="
; 8w; : (10)
Our key normative assumption is a condition on b(w; ), which can be stated as follows.
Preference neutrality. Welfare weights are independent of preferences, that is b(w; ) = b(w; 0)
for all  and 0, so we dene b (w)  b (w; ) for all .
This condition, motivated by the ethical considerations axiomatized in Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2006), amounts to assuming that income di¤erences arising from di¤erences in budget constraints
merit redistribution, whereas those arising from di¤erences in preferences do not.11 Under prefer-
ence neutrality, the objective in (8) can be written
max
fc(w);y(w)g
Z 1
=0
Z 1
w=0
b(w)U(c(w); y(w); w; )h(w; ) dw d: (11)
Let n denote unied type, so that n = w. Then, we can employ a change of variables, using
~H(; n) to denote the joint distribution of preferences and unied type, with density
~h(; n) = h(n=; )
1

: (12)
The term 1= is the absolute value of the determinant of the Jacobian @ (n=; ) =@ (; n). Let
f(n) =
R1
0
~h(; n) d denote the density of unied types arising from a given joint distribution
H(w; ). Then, substitution shows that the resource constraint (9) and the IC constraints (10)
11This denition of preference neutrality is specic to the case in which the social marginal value of any individuals
consumption depends only on the welfare weights. More generally, preference neutrality requires that individual utility
functions be scaled so that the social marginal value of consumption is independent of preferences. For examples of
such an approach, see the working paper version of this paper, Lockwood and Weinzierl (2012).
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are equivalent to (3) and (4) from the previous section. Moreover, the preference neutral planners
objective (11) can be written
max
fc(n);y(n)g
Z 1
n=0
Z 1
=0
b(n=)U(c(n); y(n); n)~h(; n) d dn =
max
fc(n);y(n)g
Z 1
n=0
 R1
=0 b(n=)
~h(; n) d
f(n)
!
U(c(n); y(n); n)f(n) dn;
or simply
max
fc(n);y(n)g
Z 1
n=0
b(n)U(c(n); y(n); n)f(n) dn; (13)
where b(n) is the mean welfare weight on individuals of unied type n under the distributionH(w; )
b(n) =
R1
=0 b(n=)
~h(; n) d
f(n)
: (14)
Note that the objective (13) is equivalent to (2), with b(n) replacing g(n).
In principle, the distribution H(w; ) could be such that b(n) would be increasing in n, even
if b(w) decreases in w. Such a situation would merit not only a reduction in redistributivity but
in fact a reversal, i.e., redistribution to higher earners, and would require income and ability to be
negatively correlated. We will set aside the technical complexities associated with this possibility
and assume that b0(n) < 0, the conventional case where the planner wishes to redistribute from
rich to poor
Assuming that H(w; ) gives rise to a distribution of unied types F (n) which satises the
standard regularity assumptions as in section 1.1, the optimal tax function in this model with two
dimensional heterogeneity satises the familiar condition (5), with cumulative welfare weights now
given by
G(n) =
R n
m=0
b(m)f(m) dmR1
m=0
b(m)f(m) dm
: (15)
The solution to the planners problem in this modied setup provides a deconstruction of the
welfare weights g(n) while being formally equivalent to the model of the previous section. That is,
it allows us to distinguish between two possible sources of disagreement about the optimal extent
of redistribution the weights b(w), and the joint distribution H(w; )that together produce the
policy-relevant weights g (n). In the next section we explore the implications of disagreements
about the second of these sources as a simple way to capture the e¤ects of preference heterogeneity
on optimal policy.
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1.4 Preference neutrality and optimal redistribution
We can now prove our rst novel analytic result using the expressions from previous subsections.
It may facilitate intuition to imagine two hypothetical planners. Those two planners agree on
the distribution of unied types F (n), the principle of preference neutrality, and the appropriate
ability-dependent welfare weights b(w), which take an isoelastic form:
b(w) = w ; (16)
for positive constant . But, these two planners have di¤ering positive beliefs about the joint
distribution of ability and preferences, H(w; ). In particular, one planner knows the true distri-
bution H(w; ), while the other incorrectly believes H(w; ) is degenerate along the  dimension,
with  = 1 for all individuals. We use carats to denote the latter planners incorrect beliefs. This
disagreement results in di¤erent policy relevant welfare weights g(n) and g^(n), and thus di¤erent
preferred tax functions T (y (n)) and T^ (y^ (n)). Specically, we can show the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume utility is quasilinear as in (1) and welfare weights b(w) are isoelastic as in
(16) : Consider the income tax function T (y (n)) that solves the planners problem in (13), (3), and
(4) given H(w; ). Consider also the income tax function T^ (y^ (n)) that solves the same planners
problem but assuming homogeneous preferences, that is  = 1 for all n. If ~H(jn) rst-order
stochastically dominates ~H(jm) whenever n > m, then T (y (n)) is less redistributive than T^ (y^ (n)).
Moreover, if the conditional distribution ~H(jn) is rst-order stochastically dominated by ~H(jm)
whenever n > m, then T (y (n)) is more redistributive than T^ (y^ (n))
In other words, this proposition establishes that the policies chosen by these two planners di¤er
in a specic way whenever higher-income individuals have stronger preferences, roughly speaking
"on average," for consumption relative to leisure than do lower-income individuals. In that case, a
planner who believes that preference heterogeneity is responsible in part for the observed income
distribution will select a less redistributive tax schedule than a planner who believes that the ob-
served income distribution is entirely due to di¤erences in ability, even though these two planners
endorse the same preference-neutral social welfare weights. The key di¤erence between these plan-
ners, then, is in their beliefs on the relative importance of ability and preferences in determining
observed incomes.
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Given certain tractable functional forms for utility and social welfare, Proposition 1 establishes
conditions under which preference heterogeneity reduces or increases the optimal extent of redis-
tribution. These analytical results help us better understand the qualitative e¤ect of preference
heterogeneity on redistribution. In the next section we look for a similarly simple guide to the size
of this e¤ect.
2 A simple statistic for the quantitative e¤ects of preference het-
erogeneity on redistribution
In this section, we introduce an intuitive summary statistic for the quantitative e¤ects of preference
heterogeneity on redistribution. Assuming certain functional forms for welfare weights, individual
utility, and the distributions of ability and preferences, we show that this statistic is in fact su¢ cient
to characterize the e¤ects of preference heterogeneity on marginal tax rates. More generally, we
show that this statistic can be used in both calibrated numerical simulations of optimal policy
in the United States and examinations of empirical evidence on existing policies and preference
heterogeneity in OECD countries.
The statistic of interest is
 =
cov(ln ; lnn)
var(lnn)
; (17)
the coe¢ cient on the best linear predictor of log preference conditional on log unied type. In other
words,  captures the expected increase in preferences for an increase in unied type.
It is possible to provide a more formal characterization of the role of  given certain simplifying
assumptions about the economy. In particular, we assume that the distributions of ability and
preferences are jointly lognormal, so that the distribution of unied types n is also lognormal.12
We can then show that marginal tax rates depend on the distribution of  only through the statistic
, as in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose the welfare weights b(w) are isoelastic as in (16), individual utility is
quasilinear as in (1), and lnw and ln  are jointly normally distributed so that the distribution
f (n) of unied type n is lognormal with 2N = V ar [ln (n)]. Then, optimal marginal tax rates
12Though evidence (see Saez 2001) shows that the upper tail of the income distribution is better described as a
Pareto distribution, lognormality has long been used in the optimal tax literature to describe most of the income
distribution (see Tuomala 1990) below the top tail.
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T 0 (y (n)) satisfy:
T 0(y(n))
1  T 0(y(n)) =
1 + 1="
nf(n)
 Z n exp((1 )2N )
0
f(m)dm 
Z n
0
f(m)dm
!
: (18)
As with the rst proposition, the mechanism behind Proposition 2 is that  a¤ects the shape of
the welfare weights g (n), which in turn determine the rst integral in (18) : In particular, that
integral decreases with , with extreme cases providing especially clear results. In the case
where  = 1 for all individuals,  = 0 and the rst integral in (18) can be shown to equalR n
m=0 b (m) f(m) dm=
R1
m=0 b (m) f(m) dm where b (m) satises (16) ; so the integral equals G(n)
from the conventional homogeneous preferences case. At the opposite extreme, if ability is homo-
geneous and all behavioral heterogeneity is due to preferences,  = 1 and the rst integral in (18)
equals
R n
0 f(m)dm, so optimal tax rates are uniformly zero.
2.1 Numerical simulations of optimal policy
We now use calibrated numerical simulations to illustrate the potential quantitative e¤ects of pref-
erence heterogeneity on optimal policy and the use of the statistic  in measuring them.
Our calibration strategy is to match the income distribution chosen by individuals as modeled
in Section 1, taking U.S. tax policy as given, to the empirical income distribution in the United
States, and thus infer a distribution of unied types F (n). We use a baseline labor supply elasticity
value of " = 0:33, the preferred estimate in Chetty (2012), accounting for optimization frictions.
To calibrate the ability distribution, we assume that unied types n are drawn from a lognormal
distribution with parameters N and 2N , and we select these parameters so that resulting income
distribution approximates the empirical distribution in the US in 2011.13 The resulting parameter
estimates, when incomes are reported in $10,000s, are N = 1:65 and 2N = 0:65. Our conceptual
results are not sensitive to these values, but having a realistic calibration makes the magnitudes of
our results easier to interpret.
The optimal policy naturally depends on the planners welfare weights. We assume they take
the isoelastic form in (16) where the planners inequality aversion is measured by . We use a
baseline value of  = 1. We then vary  as dened in (17) to see how optimal policy diverges from
13Specically, we select the parameters which minimize the sum of squared di¤erences between incomes at per-
centiles 20, 40, 60, 80, and 90 under the simulated distribution and the actual income distribution in the US in 2011,
as reported by the Tax Policy Center. For our computational expediency, we perform these simulations assuming at
taxes, as in Saez 2001, with a marginal tax rate of 30%.
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that which assumes no preference heterogeneity. Figure 1 plots marginal tax rates from (18) for
four values for , ranging from 0 (the conventional, homogeneous preferences case) to 0.75, which
loosely corresponds to three fourths of income variation deriving from preferences. The extreme
case of  = 1, in which all income variation is due to preferences and taxes are optimally zero, is
omitted.
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Figure 1: Optimal marginal tax rate schedules for
four values of .
These results expand quantitatively on the qualitative result in Proposition 1. Under this base-
line specication, for example, if  = 0:25 (so that roughly one fourth of income heterogeneity is due
to preferences) the optimal marginal tax rate falls by 5.6 percentage points for individuals earning
$50,000, and by 2.5 percentage points on those earning $500,000. This represents a substantial
change in redistributive policy the net transfer to individuals at the 10th percentile of the income
distribution falls by $2,181 annually to $27,536; net taxes levied on those at the 99th percentile
decrease by $9,649 to $134,601.
The analytic proof of Proposition 1 imposed two requirements: an absence of income e¤ects,
and Pareto weights which are isoelastic in unied type n. In the online appendix, we relax both
assumptions and nd that the inverse relationship between  and marginal tax rates still holds.
Simulations are performed using (18) in the baseline case, and numerically using the Knitro non-
linear optimization package (see Byrd et al., 2006).
These simulations demonstrate that using  provides a straightforward way in which to modify
14
a numerical version of the standard optimal tax model to determine the potential quantitative
implications of preference heterogeneity. In addition,  may be a feasible empirical target, especially
(as we now show) if somewhat unconventional sources of evidence such as surveys are brought to
bear.
2.2 Suggestive empirical patterns
To demonstrate the empirical potential of our results, and to show how the population statistic 
may be used; we now provide suggestive evidence that preference heterogeneity may be related to
real-world policy across modern developed countries in the way that our analytical results suggest.
We emphasize that these results are admittedly far from conclusive and are vulnerable to a variety
of criticisms. Our hope is that they stimulate further data gathering and empirical work that can
more reliably test for the implications of the theory in existing policy.
Our cross-sectional14 international data on preference heterogeneity and  comes from the
World Values Survey, whose international coverage of attitudes toward such topics is unmatched.
The World Values Survey asked the following question of respondents in a set of countries between
2005 and 2007: "Now I will briey describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate
for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not
like you, or not at all like you? ...It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money
and expensive things." We will use the answers to the question to measure preferences :15 This
question is well-posed for our purposes, as it attempts to have the respondent reect on his or her
underlying preferences rather than how he or she feels in the status quo, i.e., "on the margin."
Key for our purposes, the World Values Survey also asks respondents to report their place in the
income distribution (it asks which of ten "steps" the respondents household income falls into).
Since income increases monotonically with unied type, we use these reported values as a measure
of unied type n. It is possible to calculate the covariance of these data within each country, giving
us all of the components required to calculate .16
14Panel analysis would be desirable, but the survey data we use to measure preferences is available over at most a
ten-year horizon. We believe this is too narrow a window over which to expect either meaningful changes in preference
variation or a response to any such changes in policy, so we leave the analysis of panel data for future research.
15To be precise, we interpret these answer as indicating values of ln

1+1="

, where 1+1=" is the observationally-
equivalent preference factor that can be applied to either the subutility of consumption or the disutility of labor
e¤ort, as in the utility function (1) used throughout this paper, to capture relative preferences for consumption and
leisure. We therefore scale the responses to convert them to values of  with an expected value of one, to match the
assumption in Section 1.3, and then take the logarithms of those  values, before calculating . Very similar results
are obtained if we use simply the reported levels of , instead.
16Uncertainty over how respondents interpreted the scale of choices for the WVS question on preferences makes
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We relate these values of  to a standard measure of redistribution, the di¤erence between the
Gini coe¢ cients on primary (pre-tax and pre-transfer) income and disposable (post-tax and post-
transfer) income, as calculated in Wang and Caminada (2011) based on data from the Luxembourg
Income Study.17 We are able to calculate both  and this measure of redistribution for 13 countries
with PPP-adjusted GDP per capita greater than $25,000 in 2005 U.S. dollars, a simple threshold
that helps to control for the wide range of institutional variables that likely a¤ect the scale of
redistribution. Figure 2 shows the results visually.
Figure 2: Redistribution and  in 13 OECD countries
A mild but noticeable negative relationship between redistribution and  is apparent in Figure 2,
consistent with the theory developed above. That is, countries in which preference heterogeneity
plays a larger role in explaining income variation appear to have less redistributive policies. The
point estimate of the coe¢ cient on  is negative and marginally signicant (it is -2.19 with a
standard error of 1.27); it is also the slope of the best-t line shown in the gure. Though this
evidence is far from denitive, this relationship is robust to controlling for the log of GDP per
capita and the extent of inequality as measured by the pre-tax Gini coe¢ cient. It also holds if
we scale the di¤erence in Gini coe¢ cients by the starting level of inequality in each country. Of
course, any results with such a limited sample are merely suggestive of a relationship that, given
the absolute levels of  calculated in this subsection less meaningful than their relative levels across countries.
17Japan is the one exception, as it does not participate in the LIS. We rely on Tachibanaki (2005), who reports pri-
mary and disposable income Gini coe¢ cients based on Japans Ministry of Welfare and Labors Income Redistribution
Survey in his Table 1.1.
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the potential feasibility of measuring the statistic , may reward greater study.
To be clear, this relationship may very well reect interdependence rather than unidirectional
causality and be consistent with the theoretical results developed above. For example, it may be
that residents of countries with less redistributive policies tend to evolve toward having less similar
preferences. Related, it may be of interest to note that the pattern in Figure 2 is consistent with
the well-known results of Alesina and Angeletos (2005), who nd that countries in which e¤ort is
perceived to be more important than luck in determining economic success have less redistributive
policies. In the terminology of this paper, larger  implies that preferences play a larger role
in determining income relative to abilitythat is, the source of heterogeneity not deserving of
redistribution is relatively more important.
Conclusion
Taste di¤erences have played at most an implicit role in most modern optimal tax research, but
they are readily apparent in the real world and have long been a staple of broader debates over
taxation. We focus on making their role in the theory explicit. Specically, we derive the impli-
cations of heterogeneity in preferences for consumption relative to leisure that are observationally
equivalent but not normatively equivalent (in that society does not wish to redistribute income
based on these preferences) to income-earning abilities. We show two novel results on how this
heterogeneity a¤ects the optimal extent of redistribution. In both cases, we isolate a transparent
formal mechanism through which we can model the operation of preference heterogeneity, namely
changing the pattern of welfare weights the social planner assigns along the income distribution.
First, we show that long-standing intuitions about this form of preference heterogeneity reducing
optimal redistribution are incomplete but correct given a straightforward condition on how prefer-
ences relate to income. Second, we describe a simple summary statistic for measuring this e¤ect,
providing a potentially empirically-relevant way to gauge the quantitative implications of preference
heterogeneity for redistribution.
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